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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact that  changes  in the rate of money
creation and reserve requirements have on real seigniorage revenue.  We
consider two additional  features that  differ from previous analyses. First,
the model economies  grow endogenously,  and that  growth  depends on the
accumulation of intermediated capital.  Second, agents have two means of
financing; one is bank deposits against which reserves  must be held and the
other is a nonbank intermediary.  Thus, growth-rate  efiects and financing-
substitution  efiects are both  present, and one can assess  the quantitiative
importance of each factor.
1. Introductionl
What  effect do monetary policy actions have on real seigniorage  revenue? Re-
sea,rchers  have long been interested in the answer to this question. To note just
a few, Bailey (1956) applied partial-equilibrium  a.nalysis,  establishing the result
that maximum seigniorage  revenue  was  obtained when elasticity of money demand
with  respect  to the inflation rate equalled one. Friedma.n  (1971) showed  that Bai
ley's result held if output was constant. In Riedma,n's more general  setting, both
the growth rate and elasticity of money demand with  respect to ontput  a.fiected
the revenue-maximizing  inflation rate. Brock (1989) extended Friedman's result,
changing the setting from  a partial  equilibrirrm to a general equilibrirrm setup.
Easterly, Maruo, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) derive the seigniorage'maximizing
r"Research  Department,  Federal  Reserve  Bauk of Dalias  and 6 GSIA, Carnegie  Nlellon  Uni-
rersity. The authros  wish to thark Alan Ahearne,  Greg Huffman,  Finn Kydland, Casey  NIul-
ligan, Tom Tallarini, Carlos  Zatazaga,  and participants  at the 1996  SEDC annual  meetings  in
Ivlexico City  for helpful commerts ou earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed  herein
do not necessarily  represent  those of the Boa.rd  of Governors of the Federal Reserr"e  System  nor
the Federal R.Eserre  Bank of Dallas.inflation  rate in a contimrous-time ,  k-model which allows money and bonds to
be used for transactions, noting that  the revenue.maximizing inflation rate falls
as the elasticity of substitution between  money and bonds rises..,
The prupose of this paper is to examine the effects  that  two monetary policy
actions-changes  in reserve  requirements and money creation-have on the present
value of rea.l  seigniorage  revenlre. Our aim to use  the different model economies  to
quantitatively  assess  the importance of several  mechanisms  through which mon-
eta,ry  policy rnight operate. In particular,  we are interested in assessing  the im-
portance of the relationship between monetary policy actions and growth within
the context of real seigniorage  revemre. In addition, we are interested in the re-
lationship between  monetary policy actions and the development of the financial
system, focusing on how such development  might affect the revemres  earned  from
money creation.
The statistical relationship between  inflation and growth has  been  documented
by numeroru authors, including Fischer (1991), DeGregario (1992), and Gomme
(1993). Our question is, supposing monetary policy actions do influence the rate
of growth, how important  are the growth-rate effects  on the present lalue of real
seigniorage  revemre? We view the experiments as natural  extensions  of the lit-
eratrue on tax  policy  and growth.  Ireland  (1994), for example, examined the
supply-side considerations of income.tax policy, computing  the rate that  maxi-
mizes the present vahre of irrcome  tax revemre.
Another way in which monetary policy can affect the quantity of real seignior-
age revenue  is through its effects  on the equilibrium quantity of real base  money.
We consider two ways in which this could happen: substitution  among different
methods of financing capital and substitution among difierent means  of payment.
For the first channel,  we exarnine  an economy  in which two means  of financing a.re
available. More specifically,  households  can rse either bank deposits or nonba.nk
contracts to finance capital accumulation. The banks face a reserve  requirement,
which is the mechanism through which monetary policy  actions afiect the rate
of grov"th. Faster money creation or higher reserve  requirements reduce the rate
of return offered in the competitive banking industry.  Nonbank contracts do not
face a reserve requirement but  do incur  a resoruce cost for each unit  of capi-
tal  financed.  Households  will  switch from bank deposits to  nonbank contracts
when money growth  or the reserve  reqrdrement increases,  an effect we refer to
as disintermediation.  We can then assess  how important  this channel is for real
seigniorage  revenue.
Another way in which monetary policy might a.fiect  the quantity of real basemoney is through the means of payment.  We look at an economy in which the
household  has a choice  between  paying for goods  with credit or with cash. Clearly,
the household's  decision rega.rding  ihe holding of currency or 'paying with  credit
affects  the size of the tax base  upon which real seigniorage  revenre is generated.
By focusing on reveme maximization, we ignore welfare considerations. The
baseline  model has two eqnivalent optimal policy settings: set the reserve  require-
ment ratio equal to zero or apply the Friedman nrle so that  the gross inflation
rate is equal to  the household's time  rate of preference.? Ottr sense  of history
is that  sovereign nations generally do not  foilow either  of  these two  welfare'
maximizing policy prescriptions. Rather than search  for models  in which observed
policy settings are close  to optimal, we look at standard models and consider the
seigniorage-revemre  implications of different monetary policies.
Our results can be srrmmarized  as follows. In each model economy,  we focrn
on the quantitative magnitudes of the tensions present. Otrr results show that if
monetary policy affects the growth rate, revenue-maximizing  values for both the
inflation  rate and reserve  ratio are less than  10%. With  crrrency  in the model,
the revemre maximizing  inflation  rate a,nd reserve  ratio  are both  aroturd 20%.
Coincidentally, the revemre-maximizing reserve  ratio  and inflation  rate is quite
close  to the mean values we compute from our multi-country  dataset.
The paper is organized  as  follows. In Section  2, we describe  the baseline  model
economy. Computational  experiments are presented  in Section 3.  To assess  the
importance of the different efiects,  we modify the basic economy  to eliminate the
growth-rate effect  and the capital-substitution efiect in Section  4. In Section  5, we
extend the model economy to include currency and the role of substituting alter-
native  means of payments.  We review the findings  and suggest several extensions
in Section 6.
2. The  Baseline  Model
In this paper,  growth-rate  a,nd  disintermediation  efiects  are  opposite  to the  "di-
rect"  effects associated  with  the monetary policy variables. The seigniorage  tax
2see  Chari, Cbristiano, and Kehoe (1996) for recent findings on the optimal  monetary policy.
In  Ivlulligan a.ud Sala-llvlartin  (1996), the authors consider an alternative  motive  for holding
fiat  money shopping-time-  and derire  different settings for optimal  monetary  policy-  In  this
paper, we used a rationale for holding fiat money that  is more l.ike  ihe Chari,  Christiano,  and
Kehoe setup. Dotsey and Irela.nd (1996) consider welfare in an environment where using credit
as a means of payment  requires  labor  effort.rate is positively a^ssociated  with  the inflation  rate.  The bank holds fiat money
to satisfy a reserve  requirement.  Consegrently, the seigniorage  tax base, hold-
ing everything else  constant, is positively related to the reserve  .requirement. In
contrast, output  growth is inversely related to both  the inflation  rate and the
reserve  requirement. Thus, the growth-rate effect transiates into a tax base  that
increases  at a slon'er  rate. I{oreover, a higher inflation rate or reserve  ratio, for in-
stance,  has a one'time allocative effect,  causing  households  to shift from acquiring
capital through the bank to acqr ring capital through the nonbank intermediary.
Throughout  this paper, we refer to changes  in the means of financing as disin-
termediation, though strictly  speaking all capital is intermediated in this model
economy. The computational experiments show the change in the present value
of real seigniorage  revenue  for different values  of the inflation rate a,nd  the reserve
ratio.
The economy  is populated by five types of decision-makers:  firms, households,
banks, nonba,nk intermediaries, and the government.  Firms  rent  capital  from
banks, producing rurits of the consrlmption good. Banks ofier deposit contracts,
maturing in one period, to households. The deposits are used to acquire capital
or fiat  money.  Households receive the principal  and interest from  the deposit
contracts and the (gross)  rental payments from the capital phrs any undepreciated
capital to acqu.ire  consumption, capital, or deposits.
The nonbank intermediary  (hereafter, nonba.nk) also offers one-period con-
tracts to households.  Each nonbank contract stipulates that the nonbank accepts
one good from the household,  promising to repay the household  next period with
fi'  goods.  The nonbank then uses these contracts to  acquire capital, which is
then rented to firms in a competitive market to prodrtce the capital-consumption
good. The gross  return  on nonbank contracts, unlike deposits, is determined by
the quantity  of good received  by the nonbank. To this end, we assume  that  the
nonbank faces  a resource  cost /(k"),  where k'  stands for the number of contracts
executed  with  the nonbank.
The government taxes capital income a.nd  makes  lumpsum  transfer payments
to households.  The government can finance a deficit in any period by issuing one.
period bonds. The bond sells for {  units of the consumption good and pays off
ll111bf units one period later.  For simplicity, we asstlme  that  government bonds
and capital are perfect substitutes. Throughout the analysis,  we assume  that the
quantity  of government debt is small enough that  bonds, deposits, and nonbank
contracts will be held bv households.2.1, Model  Specification




where d111  denotes  the quantity  of goods deposited with  the bank at time t,
,bf denotes  the stock of nonbank contracts available  at time t, .R;  denotes  the gross
real return on deposits, ,Ri denotes  the gross  real return ofiered on nonba,nk  con-
tracts and government bonds, ft denotes  the tax rate on both bank-financed and
nonbanl*-financed  capital, and Gr denotes  the value of the government transfer.3
We assume  the time rate of preference,  B, Iies in the open unit interval. Similarly,
capital depreciates  at a constant rate, with  0 < 6 <  1. The consta,nt  elasticity of
substitution  pa.rameter,  1/a,  is strictly  positive.  Finally, population is constant
so that there is no aggregation  bias associated  with  treating per-capita qua"ntities
as aggregate  quantities.
Equation 2.1 is a fairly standard budget constraint. The household uses  pro-
ceeds  frorn bank deposits,  government  bonds, and nonba,nk  contracts phrs the real
value of government transfer payments to acquire units of the consumption good
and storage. Goods can be stored for future consumption by acquiring deposits,
govennnent bonds, or nonbank contracts. Here,  we are assuming  that government
bonds and nonba.nk  contracts are perfect substitutes.
Letting  ,\1  denote the Lagrangian multiplier,  the consumer's  first-order cond!
tions are:
Btcl"  -)1  :Q
BL+rc,  !, -  ,\',', :  0
)t+tR,+t-)r:0
3lncome taxes will  not  play  a crucial role in the experiments,  In  equilibrium,  the rate of
return  on deposits will  depend on  the income tax  rate.  We also conducted the  quantatitive
analysis  with  r  =  0.  The  results  for  the  nc  income.tax  case axe not  materially  difierent  from
those reported here and are arailable from the authors upon request,
oo  /^1-"  -  1\
max)-/?'t-  I
ia  \  r-d  ./
s.t.  : c1  *  fr*, * dt+t+ kl*, < RLdt  + RTUft  + k?)  + Gt
(r  r\
(2.3)
(2.4)where the first-order conditions, equations (2.2)-(2.6), are taken with  respect to
c1, c11;1,  d41, bf*1 (and ftlir),  and .\1,  respectively. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) im-
ply that  deposits, government bonds, and nonbank contracts will ofier the same
rate of return in equilibrium.  In addition, a transversality condition is necessa,ry
to ensure the existence  of the household's  present-value  budget constraint.  The
household's terminal  constraint is interpreted as a no.Ponzi-condition in which
the household ca.nnot  borrow against the sum of future deposits, nonbank con-
tracts, and government  bonds, at a rate greater than can be repaid. Formally, the
transversality condition is represented  as
),_rRi,,  - tr,: o
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As such, the date-t budget constraint (2.1) can be combined into an infinite hori-
zon, present  vahre  budget constraint. We now describe  the environment from the
perspective  ofthe  other types of decisionmakers  in the model economy-  Through-
out orrr analysis, we assume  that  uits  of the consumption good can be trans-
formed into units of capital at a one-for-one  rate.
The  firm  rents capital from  either banks or nonbanks, using it  to produce
the capital-consrrmption good.  Capital is perfectly substitutable in the produc-
tion process  and the firm  is a price.taker in the input  ma.rket. The production
technology is of the form
Y:  A(k,+  k?) /, e\
where ,k1  is the stock of intermediated capital rented from  banks and kiis  the
stock of capital rented from the nonbank. The laws of motion for bank-financed
and nonbank-fina.nced  capital are:
k;_pl  :  (1 -6)fu1Jr1,
i{hr:(r-6)ki+xi,
(2.s)
(2.10)where or and rf  denote  the amount of investment added  in time t. The rental price
of bank-financed  and nonbank-financed  capital, denoted q1  and qf, are determined
competit  ively.
Because  the firm rents capital from two sorrces at a competitively determined
price, profit maximization simplifies to a series  of static problems. Formally, the
firm's problem is written  as
tn?I  /(kr + kl) - q,k,  - sikT /p9\
The  first-order conditions for  the firm  arc A  :  q :  q".  (We drop  the  time
srrbscripts  since  ,4 is not dependent  on time.)
Banks accept one.period deposits from the households,  using the proceeds  to
acquire capital and fiat money. Capital is then rented to firms and fiat money is
held to satisfy a reserve  requirement imposed by the government. The bank max-
imizes profits in a perfectly competitive environment. For simplicity, we assume
that  the bank costlessly  provides intermediary services. Because  the deposits are
one-period contracts, the bank's infinite.horizon  program reduces  to a sequence
of static problems. When deposits are liquidated, the bank transforms its assets
into  the consumption good.  Hence, each rrnit of capital rented to firms returns
A + (l  -  d) units of the consumption good-
Because  fiat money is rate of return dominated by capital, the reserve  require.
ment'yr dictates how much fiat money the bank witl hold. In short, rate-of-retu.rn
dominance implies that  the asset allocation constraint, ^ltpt-tdt  (  rnr, is bind-
ing at each date f,  where m denotes the per-household qua.ntity of fiat  money
balances. The bank's profit-maximization  problem is
.ma-x.  (..4  + I -6)kr +Pt-tm' - R,d,
Er,fnldr  Pt
subject  to the reserve-requirement  constraint  and a balance.sheet  identity,  which
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where n1 :  -2r  denotes the rate of inflation.  Equation (2.11) indicates that  the
rate of retrrrn on deposits is inversely related to the inflation rate and the reserve
ratio.
Capital can also be acqrired from the nonbank intermediary. We move on to
the problem solved  by the nonbank. The nonbank intermediary accepts  goods  withthe promise to pay off the contract one period later.  With  one-period contracts,
the nonbank maximizes  a series  of static problems- Formally, the nonbank's date-f
profit  maximization problem is given by
mq-\  (A  + 1  - 6)fr1  - f (k?)  -  Rrk,
kl'
The rronbank's  first-order condition is
(P4)
RT:@+1-6)  -l(k7). (2.r2)
As we have already noted in  the household's problem, the retrun  to  nonbank
contract and bank deposits will be equal in equilibrium.
In  the data, both  ba.nks  and nonbanks are used to fina:rce capital  accumu-
iation.  For our model economy to match this observation, there must be some
wedge  between  the return ofiered on nonbank contracts and the ma.rginal  product
of capital.  We introduce the resource  cost, denoted /(frll),  as a way to generate
a.n  equilibriurn in which both bank deposits and nonbank contracts would coex-
ist.  Without  the resotrce-cost function, nonbank contracts would rat+of-return
dominate bank deposits.  We assume the resotrce-cost function  has a positive
marginal cost function; that is, /'(.)  )  0. Moreover, we assume  that the resorrce-
cost fimction  is convex; that  is, /"(.)  >  0-  It  is fairly  straightforward to show
that  the arbitrage condition requires that  ///(.)  )  0 for the model economy to
exhibit  disintermediation.  Formally, ff  and ff  are nonnegative as long as the
resouce-cost function is convex.4
The nonbank's resource.cost  function is stnrctured so that some  properties of
the model economy match some obserrations in the actual data.  For example,
Goldsmith (1969)  finds that the ratio of bank assets-to-GNP  had an rtpward trend
during the period 1869-1963. With  A  <  1, oru model economy can account for
Goldsmith's observation. There is a price for this setup. In our model economy,
the ratio of investment financed  through barik deposits  to output is constant along
the balanced-gro*th  path.  However, the ratio  of investment financed through
nonbank contrarts to outprrt approaches  zero. Thus, all growth is financed with
capital  financed throrigh  the bank.  This  aspect of the model economy is not
4The resource cost can be interpreted  as a monitoring  cost incurred because the noDbank
does not  have access  to  specialized banking  resources. Bernanke  (1983) has cited the loss of
these specialized resources  as a major  propagation mechanism for the Great Depression. This
specification is isomorphic  to  one in  which  households pay a monitoring  cost to  observe the
nonbank's behavior.observed  in the data. One way to get around this problem is to make all growth
exogenous.  Another way would be to introduce technological  innovation into the
nonbank sector captured as changes  in  /(.)  over time.  In addition, we consider
stationary economies  later in this paper, thereby eliminating growth as a cha,nnel
through which monetary policy can affect seignorage.
Finally, the government commits to a seqilence  {G1}[o  of transfers which are
financed by a combination of taxes and seigniorage. The government's budget
constraint is
RtW  + Gt  -r r1Alh1+  kfl + W+1.
The government has at its  disposal two tools of monetary  policy:  the reserve
reqrtirement and the rate of money growth.  We assrrme  that  money evolves  ac-
cording to  the  policy  rule:  m1 :  0{nt-t,  where d is the money growth rate.
Moreover, the government's ability  to issue  debt is constrained such that
lhr^] ;* Ln=al  : o
which ensures  the government's infinite-horizon, present-value  budget constraint
exists.
2,2. Equilibrium  and  balanced-growth  equations
An  equilibrirrm in  this  model economy is a sequence  of prices {pt,  qt, q7,  Rr,
l?|)[0,  real al]ocations {q,  x1, x!,  kt., kT)|-'  stocks of financial assets  {rn1, d1,
ff)po,  and policy variables  {11,06 11,G1}f_o  such  that
(i)  the real allocations and stocks of financial assets  solve the household's
maximization problem, (P1), given prices a.nd  policy variables;
(ii)  the real allocations solve the firm's  date-t profit  maximization  problem,
(P2), given prices and policy variables;
(iii)  the stock of financial assets  solve the bank's date-t profit  maximization
problem, (P3), given prices and policy rariables;
(iv) the stock of financial assets  solve  the nonbank's dat+.t profit maximization
problem, (P4), given prices a.nd  policy rariables;
(v) the money market equilibrium condition m1-  t :  ^ttdtpt-t is satisfied  Vt > 0;(vi) the goods  market equilibrium  condition c6* k1a1- (1  -  6)ft,  + Ahr -  (1  -
6)kY  -  ngr' + fti) is  satisfied  Vt  )  0.
In this economy,  eventuaily all capital will be financed through the bank. The
household's  first-order conditions imply that the gross  real return on deposits  and
nonbank contracts will  be identical.  Hence, Rt:  R?.  (Note that the household
pays taxes on capital  income-  Consequently the gross after-tax real return  is
(t -f,)[(l  -rr)A+  1-6]  + *.)t  fnis  arbitrage  condition  is represented  as
(r-r,)t(r  -r,)A+1-rl+]  :ttt -r)A-rr-61- f'(k?).  (2.13)
Now all one needs  to solve for the two types of capital is an initial  condition
stipulating the quantity of total capital. Throughout the analysis  here,  we assume
that  the dateO total capital stock-k'*  k-equals one. Frorn (2.13), the stock of
nonbank-financed capital  will  be constant as long as the  policy  variables and
the total  factor productivity  terms are constant.  With  zf  :  6kT for all t,  the
ratio  of nonbank-financed capital  to  total  capital  approaches  zero as f  ---, oo.
With  0 <  '4 <  1, the ba.nk's  asset-to-output ratio will  rise over time.  Thrm, the
model economy's  prediction for intermediated capital matches  with a stylized fact
regarding banks' behavior.
The consumer's  first-order conditions also implv that
l:tuo'1r
Balanced  gror*th implies that bank-financed  investment, output, deposits,  govern-
ment spending  will grow at the same  rate as consumption. With  deposits  growing
at the same rate as consumption, the money market clearing condition implies
the following relationship between money growth and inflation:
q:  U3R):rt. (2.15)
Thcrefore, we ca.n  consider the government as directly  controlling the inflation
rate, rather than simply the rate of money creation.
As noted in King and Rebelo (f990), the agent's utility  is finite if and only if
0@n)+  <  1. The King-Rebelo condition holds for all experiments conducted
sAs noted in Footnote 3, income taxes do not play a crucial role'  We included them mainly
to keep the amount of seigniorage  within  a reasonable  range. See  Haslag (1994) for details.
(2.14)
t0in  this paper.  For the remainder of the paper, we consider only  cases  where
the policy variables are constant over time.  We also choose  to disregard certain
portions of the parameter space. As Jones  and Nlanuelli (1992).show,  part of the
parameter space  results in no growth.  In our model, this implies that  all capital
will  be fina.nced  through the nonbank.  rv\te  therefore limit  ourselves  to the part
of the parameter space  for which the quantity of intermediated capital is strictly
positive and endogenous  growth occurs.
3. Monetary  Policy Experiments
In this section, we compute the present r,alue  of government revenles for va,rious
settings of the reserve  ratio and the inflation rate.  Following Ireland (1994), we
begin our investigation by setting the baseline  vahres  of G0, 10, and n0. We then
ask whether it is possible to fund the sarne  sequence  of expenditures for difierent
values of 7  or a.  In  essence,  we ask whether the growth  effects and capital-
substitution effects  induced by changes  in moneta,ry  policy will result in revenue
strfficient  to cover  the revenue  losses  due to a lower tax base  (reserve  requirements)
or tax rate (inflation rate).
3.1. Calibration
To qua.ntitatively assess  this model economy,  we must first select parameter val-
ues. Table 1 presents  the pa,rameter  settings rised in the baseline  computational
experiments. Most a.re  sta"ndard  in the literatrue; accordingly,  we reserve  more de.
tailed discussion  for selecting  va.lues  of the model-specific  parameters. The values
for the inflation  rate a"nd  reserve  reqrrirement were obtained from cross-country
data.  We obtained price, bank reserve, and bank deposit data for a sample of
82 countries, spanning the period 1975-94.  The (gross)  inflation  rate and reserve
ratio presented  in Table 1 are the sample averages  for those 82 countries.
There is little  guida.nce  in calibrating  the parameters for the nonbank con-
tracts.  One usefirl observation is the fraction of the capital stock that  could be
financed using bank deposits. Data on the stock of private capital is measured  in
current dollars, rning end-of-year figures. Capital  is defined as the net value of
fixed private capital phn  consumer durable goods .  (These data are taken from
Fixed.  Reproducible  Tangible Wealth in the United States,  1925-89). We use Fed-
eral Reserve's  definition of M2, subtracting currency held by the nonbank public
llto get an aggregate  measure  of deposits in the two classifications.G  In thc model
economyJ  the bank's balance sheet identity  \s d:  m *  k.  We next subtract the
value of bank reserves,  The result is a measure  of what frac.tion of capital accu-
mulation would be firranced  bv bank deposits,  provided the bank acqrrired  capital
with deposits  proceeds  that were  not used  to satisfy the reserve  requirement. FIow
of funds data give us obserrations on banks holdings of government  bonds, which
need to be subtracted from d -  A to obtain a rneasure  of private capital.  For the
period 1959-89,  the fraction of bank-financed capital fluctuates around 22%.
To pin down the fraction of bank-financed capital in the model economy,  we
need  to specify a functional form for /(k")  and use  eqn. (2.13). Above, we argued
that  the resorrce-cost  function must be convex for disintermediation to occur in
the event of either higher reserve  ratios or higher inflation  rates. Consequently,
the functional form is chosen  from the family of functions /(k")  :  B(&")',  where
r.,;  >  1. We use  the parameter B to help pin down the fraction of capital financed  by
nonbank contracts. Clearly  both B  and cl affect the eqrrilibrium outcome. With
so little  to guide our selection of these two parameters, it  seems  essential that
we consider several difierent c.ombinations  to determine whether a robust set of
results emerges.  We u.se  four combinations B and tu  such  that the model economy's
fraction of bank-financed capital is roughly 227o  at r  :  1.04 and f  :  0.07: (i)
B  :  0.0042  and  o.'  :  1.5;  (ii) B:0.0031  and  ru  :  s;(iii)  B:0.0053  and
ru  :  10;.(iv)  B :  21.5  and r.,.'  :  50.
3.2.  Computational  Experiments
In  this  paper, the computational  experiments involve the present-vahre  of the
government budget constraint.  Balanced growth simplifies the computations in
the sense  that  real transfer payments grow at the same rate as orttpttt.  Hence,
the ratio of rea) government spending to output  is constant.
We begin by characterizing the government's budget constraint.  Consider a
case  in which the government is balancing its budget at each date l.  Thus, with
bf :  0,  V t, the constraint becomes
Gt:ry!-:!i-)  + rAlkr.y ki:l.
Pt
(3.1)
bAfter  1992, reserve  requirements apply against checkable  deposits but not time and savings
accounts.  \&'e use \'I2  deposits, checkable deposits and  time  and  savings accounts, because
reserr,e  requirements applied against both deposits types for most the sample period and across
most of the sample countries.
12With  a :  G1f  K1 a constant,T  one can represent  the value of government's date-t
expenditures as
Next, we set equations (3.1) equal to (3.2) and substitute the money supply rule,
yielding
.v,,  (  |  ^rrl
@  - t)+  irAlkl+ kfl  : ae 
{n  [f 
r  --y)((1  - r,)A+'r  - 5)  * ;)] 
(3.3)
Rrrther  substitution  of the ba.r*'s asset allocation constraint yields the date-l
budget constraint as a fimction of the reserve  requirement, the inflation rate, the
income tax rate, and the stocks of capital financed through banks and nonbanks.
Formally,
9:Pt,  *rAlk,+ftil  =a4  {Blo -r)((1-r,)A+  r-d)*rl};  11.+t (1  -r)2  "  t  L'  ""  zTJ)
The first term on the left-hand side of (3.4) is datet  real seigniorage  revemre.
Summing over all dates yields the present value government budget constraint
G,  :  .,A{n 
[fr 
- 7)((1  - 4),4  + I - 6). 
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(3.2)
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where G0 is the " baseline" present value of government  spending. In other words,
G0 represents  the present  value associated  with monetary policy pararneters  set at
70 a.nd  z0 and constant r.  Note that PVG  is measured  in units of the consumption
good.
Now we characterize  the change  in the present vahre government btrdget con-
straint,  d(PVG),  for a given change in monetary policy.  Suppose,  for example,
monetary policy parameters change to new vahres,  denoted z'l and'yl.  The ex-
periment asks  whether the same  sequence  of expenditures, with  the possibility of
short-term debt-financing, can be financed while the present-r'alrte  of government
expenditures is still  in balance.  The present vahre of the government's budget
7A constant valte  for G  f K  is equiralent to limiting  condition  that C lY  is constant- \!'e use
G  lK  and equation (3.2) because  it closely parallels the derivation in Ireland  (1994).
13constraint under the new parameters is computed and compared with  the initial
setting. The government can fund the same  sequence  of transfers if a.nd  only if
> o  (3.6) tt kl + rAkit  f  k! + rAkTo
pt _ 1Bpt1!  pt _ 1ppo1i
where  ro = fl##  * r,4 aml  ''  = f;iS  * rA.  Equation  (3.6)  will be  the
basis for our 
'comiutational 
experiments. Specifically, the experiments quantify
difierences  in the present value of government expenditures for different settings
of the monetary policy parameters. As such, the results compare two different
economies  with  difierent a.nticipated,  permanent vahres  for the inflation rate and
reserve  requirement ratio.
From equation (3.6), it is straightforward to account for the multiple channels
through which movements  in the monetary policy variables  operate on the change
in the present-value  of government spending. Consider, for instance, an increase
in the reserve  requirement. First, the term r  merges  movements  in the seigniorage
tax base  and tax rate. For an increase  in the reserve  requirement, c increases;  the
higher the reserve  requirement, the more fiat money the bank is forced to hold.
Second, as noted from  equation (2.11), an increase in  the reserve  requirement
Iowers the retrun on deposits. This effect manifests itself through a decrease  in
intermediated capital. Ultimately, the substitution from bank deposits  to nonbank
contracts, referred to as disintermediation reduces  the seigniorage  tax base. In
addition, the lower return on deposits  mea,ns  that the economy's  growth rate falls,
implying  a permanent decrease  in the path of government expenditures. Lastly,
the discoturt factor in the denominator of (3.6) is inversely related to the return
on deposits. Hence,  a,n  increase  in the reserve  requirement means  that  the lower
path  of government  purchases is discounted less heavily  over time.
Overall, the effect of the increase  in resetve  reqitirements on the present-value
of government expenditures is ambiguous.  Simila.r ambiguities arise when one
considers  an increase  in the inflation rate.  Thus, the computational experiments
quantify  the  efiects that  different  monetary  policy  settings  have on government
spending.  Whether  the present-value of spending rises or falls in response to
economies  with  lower (higher) inflation rates can also  identify whether a dynamic
Laffer curve is present for inflationa.ry finance.
Figure 1 plots d(PVG)  associated  with  a change in the reserve  requirement
ratio, starting with the initial r,alue  10 :  0.173.8  Each cell in Figure 1 corresponds
8We  compute  d(PVG) for  1€  [0.01.0.25].  Note  that s  ? -  0.35,  the  graph  is  dominated  by
l4to a different setting for the nonbank's resource-cost  function.  The experiments
take the stream of expenditures a,nd  the policy settings as given. The question is
whether the present  value of real seigniorage  revemle  increases,  decreases,  or stays
the same  s'hen there is a permanent, anticipated change  in a policy variable. What
the four cases  show is that the model economies  a,re  qualitatively very similar. In
each case, d(PV G)  >  (<)  0 fory  (  (>)  .y0. The most striking  feature is the
consistency  of the plots; that  is, the profile is fairly  flat, dropping off for reserve
ratios above 17%. Closer inspection indicates that  a revenue-maximizing  reserve
ratio is present for each resolirce-cost  function.
The quantitative  findings mirror  the economics  embodied in equation (3.6).
Specifically,  the model's data indicate that with a lower reserve  ratio, faster grou'th
and the substitution from nonbank contracts to bank deposits  combine  to raise  the
tax base  upon which seigniorage  revenue  is computed. Compared  with the baseline
policy settings, the increase  in the tax base  more than offsets  the reduction in the
tax base  stemming from the lower reserve  ratio in present value terms.
Generally speaking,  t: determines  the speed  of disintermediation; Nlore specif-
ically, a one-percentage-point  increase  in reserve  ratios produces a larger decline
in the fraction of date-l  capital financed via bank deposits when c.r  :  1.5 than
when a; :  50. For seigniorage  revemre,  the difierent values of o', therefore, imply
that a given increase  in the reserve  ratio has a larger efiect on the tax base  when
r,.r  is smaller. In efiect, smaller vaiues of r.,'  intensify disintermediation.e Despite
the large difierence  in the resource-cost  function, there is only a smaller quantita-
tive difference in the revemre-maximizing  values of the reserve  ratio.  Panel A of
Table 2 reports the reserve  ratio that maximizes the present-value  of real seignior-
age revemre  for each of the four resoruce.cost  functions. In our experiments, the
revemre-maximizing  reserve  ratio is 2% for r.,.': 1.5 a,nd  8% for ar:50.10
the huge spike which arises  because  -Rl approaches  (0.d)*  from aborre,  causing the denominator
of d(PVG)  to change  from a positive number to a negative number.  A similar effect arises  in the
inflation  rate experiments. Graphs for these cases  are arailable ftom  the authors upon request.
eTo get a sense  of the speed  of disintermediation  across  the different cases.  With  c,;  :  50, the
fraction  of datel  capital financed via banks falls from 23.3% at ? :0.01  to I7.7To at ? :0.25-
Wiih  i.,:  1.5, the fraction of datel  capital financed via banks falls from 88.1% at ?:0,01  to
1.6%at1=Q.Q!'.
loAnother  implication  of the equation  (3.6) is that  one can see that  the effects of monetary
policy  settings  are  not  independent  of  one  enother.  Instead  of  using  the  sample  mean  from
the cross-country dataset, v/e use the sample mean for the U.S. sample computed using data
for the period  1959-95; that  is, z' :  L042.  We then redid the reserve-ratio experiments.  The
chief difference  is that  given  a one-percentags  point  ilcrease  in the  reserve ratio,  the  decrease in
the equilibrium  rate of output  gro!'th  is smaller when the inflation  rate is lower. There is also
15Figrue 2 plots d(PVG)  irr the inflation-rate  experiments'  We compute the
change in  the present value of real seigniorage  revenue for r  €  [1.0,f.40].  As
with the reserve  ratio experiments,  we consider  four sets  of pa,rameter  settings for
the nonbanks' tesoutce'cost fimction.  The cells in Figure 2 look similar to one
a,nother  and similar to those in Figure 1. There is small qua.ntitative difiererrce
in the revenu+maximizing inflation rates across  the different resource'cost  func-
tions.  Panel B of Table 2 reports the irrflation rates that  maximize the present
value of real seigniorage  revenrle. Our findings indicate that  a 1% inflation rate
maximizes the present value of real seigniorage  revenue  when disintermediation
is relatively fast and lhat 9Vo  inflation rate maximizes the reventre  rneasure  when
disintermediation is slower.
Overall, orr  resr ts show that a dynamic Lafier curve is present  for reasonably
calibrated economies. These findings reflect the fact that  higher reserve  ratios
and inflation rates result in slower growth rate and reduce the fraction of capital
financed via bank deposits. The presence  of the Laffer curve indicates that  the
growth-rate effects  and disintermediation calse reductions in the quantity of real
fiat money balances,  more than offsetting the effects  that higher reserve  ratios and
higher inflation rates have directly on real seigniorage  revenue. Interestingly, the
results of computational experiments suggest  that the revemre-maximizing  policy
settinss are well below the sample means  taken from the cross-country data.
4. Assessing  quantitative  importance
In this section, we quantitatively  assess  the contribution  of the growth-rate and
capital-substitution effects. In other words, how much does  the revemre-maximizing
policy setting change  for a case  in which either endogenotrs  growth or disinterme-
diation is eliminated?
4.1. The  growth-rate  effect
In this model economy,  the agent's budget constraint is given by:
Q *  d'41 *  4*,  < Rr(dt + bet)  + Gt (4.1)
less saving since the gross rate of return  on deposits (and nonbark  contracts) also falls'  With
o:50,  the revenue.maxirnizing reserve  requirement is 8% when z :1.214,  but falls to  1% for
the case  in which r  :  1,042.
toNote that  the budget constraint eliminates nonbank contracts as a means to fi-
nance firture consumption.  (We also assume  that  government bonds and bank
deposits are perfect substitutes as a means to store for future consumption.)  In
the absence  of the nonbank contracts, there is no capital-substitution efiect. With
this modification, the present-value  expression  becomes
(4.2)
The question is, How does  d(PVG)  respond to changes  in the reserve  require-
ment or the inflation rate? Figues  3 and 4 provide quantitative  answers  to these
questions,  plotting the value of d(PVG)  for different values  of the reserve  require-
ment and the inflation  rate, respectively.  As in  previous figures, both  show a
d(PVG)  curve that  is humpshaped.  The chief difierence is where the revenue-
ma-ximizing  values of the reserve  ratio and inflation rate occllr.
In the absence  of nonbank contracts, a higher reserve  requirements  lowers  the
return  to bank deposits, which has two efiects: the rate of growth declines  and
saving is less  attractive.  For real seigniorage  reve  le, deposits grow more slowly,
resulting in a slower growth in the tax base. For this model economy,  the present
vahre of real seigniorage  revenue  is maximized when ? :  0.23.
Figure 4 plots d(PVG)  for alternative values of the inflation  rate.  As with
the experiments in  which  the reserve requirement cha.nges,  the d(PVG)-curve
is humpshaped.  The  qualitative  reasons are the same as those given for the
reserve-ratio  experiments. For the inflation-rate experiments,  the present  value of
real seigniorage  revenue  reaches  a maximum  at,  r  :  1.34.
The experiments in this section offer some insight into how irnportant  disin-
termediation is for rea,l  seigniorage  revenue. With  disintermediation eliminated,
the revenue.maximizing  reserve  ratio increases  from 8% to 23% while the revemre-
maximizing inflation rate increases  from g% to 34%.
The experiments in this section focus on an extremely unsophisticated econ-
omy from the standpoint of financial development. With  no other means  to store
for fitture  consumption tha"n  ba.nk  deposits, the results from our counterfactual
experiments suggest  that the revemre-maximizing  policy settings would be higher
tha"n  the sarnple  means taken from across  countries.
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t74.2. Disintermediation
Here,  we assume  that nonba,nk  contracts are present,  brrt changes  in monetary pol-
icy settings do not affect the rate of grorvth. We assume  that there is a stationary
level of bank deposits and nonbank contracts. Consequently,  disintermediation is
present, but  the growth-rate efiect is eliminated.  In steady-state, real seignior-
age revemre  is constant. For this no-growth case,  comparisons  are made between
the steady-state vahres  of real seigniorage  revenue  instead of the prment-value of
government receipts.
Figures 5 a.nd 6 plot  the difierence in  steady-state seigniorage  revenue for
different values of the reserve  reqtrirement and inflation  rate, respectively. The
steady-state value of real seigniorage  revenue is computed, using the following
ex-oression:
7 rrr  - lt.
1  - 1  o'
(4.3)
The quantity of bank deposits,  and hence  fr, is inversely  related to both the reserve
ratio a,nd  inflation rate. However, k does  not increase  over time.
For these experiments, we use the baseline  pa.rame.ter  settings for the reserve
ratio  and inflation  rate.  Figure 5 plots the change  in real seigniorage  revenles,
comparing the steady-state  level of real seigniorage  at different reserve  ratios with
seigniorage  raised with  ?  :  0.173.  We use the fotrr versions of the nonba.nk's
resource-cost  functions as we did in the experiments in the baseline  economy. In
three of the four experiments, real seigniorage  revemre  exhibits a humpshaped
pattern.  These three experiments correspond to cases  in  which the nonbank's
resolrce-cost function results in the fastest disintermediation. With  c,;  :  50, dis-
intermediation  is at its slowest, and higher reserve  ratios result in greater real
seigniorage  revenue. These results are not too surprising; faster disintermedia-
tion translates roughly into measruing the speed  of adjustment in bank reserves.
Clearly, as bank reserves  fall quickly in response  to higher teserve  requirements,
disintermediation will  tend to quantitatively  dominate the higher reserve  ratio'
If,  however, disintermediation is "too  slow," bank reserves  will  rise despite the
declinc in bank deposits a,nd  real seigniorage  tevemre  rises.
Figure 6 plots the change in  real seigniorage  reve  re for different inflation
rates. As in the experiments above,  the baseline  vahre  is rr :1.214.  In two of the
four inflation-rate experiments,  real seigniorage  revemre  exhibits the hump-shaped
pattern.  Interestingly, in the case  in which disintermediation is occurring at the
fast pace, a  :  1.5, real seigniorage  revenue is strictly  increasing in the inflation
18rate. In this case.  the steady-state level of bank deposits is quite low at r  :  1.0.
Even though disintermediation occlrs rapidly, recall that we assume  deposits are
norinegative. Corrsequently,  there is not enough of a change  in bank deposits to
offset the increase  in the tax rate that corresponds  to a higher inflation rate when
a :1.5.  With a':  5 or a.':  10,  bank deposits  are large  enortgh  so that at Iow
inflation  rates, disintermediation is rapid enough that  the humpshaped  pattern
emerges.
The purpose  of this exercise  is to assess  the importance of the growth-rate effect
on real seigniorage  revemre. The computational  experiments eliminate growth
from the economy,  not jrmt the ability of monetary policy to influence  growth. Our
results suggest that  eliminating  growth, the revemre-maximizing  policy settings
are very high, except for the economies  in which disintermediation is extremely
(and probably irnplausibly) rapid.
5. Does currency  matter?
Thus far, the experiments ignore the role the taxing currency could have on the
revemre.maximizing inflation  rate.  The obvious question is whether including
cr[rency  affects the quantitative  results.  Because  currency accollnts for srtch a
large fraction of base  money in ma,ny  countries, there is a sense  in which currency
matters more than bank reserves. This section explores how currency (the tax
base) responds  to movements  in monetary policy variables.
In  general, the date.t  equilibrium  vahre of real revemre earned from money
creation can be expressed  as follows
(rr+r,)(1-;) (5.1)
where s denotes  real currency bala.nces  while r  denotes  real reserves.  Obviously,
the crucial feature for revenle maximization is the way in which currency is in-
troduced into the model.
For the seigniorage  rate, what is important  is the condition that the ma.rginal
rate of substitution between  the cash  good and the credit good equals  the nominal
interest rate. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983),  we introduce a cash-in-advance
constraint into the our basic reserve-requirement  economy. Srtppose,  for example,
the momentarv utilitv  function is
(1  - o)-1[(cr-+  + n  x  c2-'!)-r/'!)1-",
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(5.2)lvhere cl  is the consumption good acqrdred through accumr ated cash (the cash
good) and c2 is acquired with  current period receipts (the credit good).ll  For
this specification, ry' )  -l.determines  the rate at which households  a.re  willing
to substitrrte the credit good for the cash good.  With  this utility  function, the




where I  :  r'R.  Equation  (5.3) establishes  the inverse relationship between the
cash good and the inflation  rate.  Further, with  a binding cash-in-advance  con-
straint;  that  is, s :  c1.  It  follows immediately  that  real ourency  holdings are
negatively related to the inflation rate.
Consider two special cases  for setting the parameter t!.  For t! ---+  -1,  the two
consumption goods  are (approaching)  perfect substitutability.  With  an increase  in
the inflation  rate,  consumption  ofthe cash  good  wili approat'h  zero.  Eqrration  (5.1)
tells rrs  that seigniorage  from currency approaches  zero. In contrast, with r/ "'+ 66,
the two consumption goods  are approaching  perfect complementarity. Because  the
cash good and consumption are consumed  in fixed proportions, a higher inflation
rate has an imperceptible efiect on the s. Thus, seigniorage  reve  le increases  in
response  to higher inflation.
For our purposes,  the question is whether including currency significantly af-
fects either the reserve  ratio or the inflation rate that maximizes the present  valrte
of seigniorage  revenue. We nur the inflation-rate experiments with  ry'  :  -0.7  and
lt  :5.0.12  Figures  7 and 8 plots d(PVG)  for the case  irr which ry'  :  -0.7  and
o  :  50.  The parameter setting may appear a bit  awkward; for c,.r  :  50 disin-
termediation is at slowest  setting while ,1,  :  -0  7 sets substitution between cash
and credit goods at a fairly quick pace. As such, the parameters settings seem  to
llThe  Federal Reserve  Board commissioned hro surveys on consumer expenditures. In  both
the  1984 and 1986 surveys, roughly  30% of consumer expenditures were conducted using cur-
rency. To calibrate the model with a cash-in-advance  constraint, we use  the survey data a.s  a mea-
sure ofc2/c1-  In addition, we use  the arerage inflation rate and reserve  ratio for the U.S. or,er  the
period 1975-93. Equation  (5.3) is used as the guide to back out the ralue of 4 that  is consistent
rvith the ratio of c2/c1, taking the ralue of {, as given. For r7r  =  -9.715.91,  q :  1.  fa89(142.6282).
12In an  indirect  way, the  substitution  between the  cash and  credit  goods captures open-
economy  features.  The  credit  good can be broadly  defined  as goods purchased  with  any means
other than the domestic currency. The closer the substitution  is between currencies, the closer
the ry'  pa.rameter  will  be to -1.  Conversely,  movements in ty'  away from -1 capture the presence
of foreign currency controls. The esseniia.l  feature of our model economy is what happens to the
quantity  of real domestic currency.
20have disparate conseqlrences.  The first line of defense  is to say that  the param-
eter settings considered  in  these paper do not materially  afiect the olrtcome in
terms of cha.nging  the plots ol d(PVG).  In an efiort to save  space,  therefore, we
make the plots with  other parameter settings available upon reqlrest. Note that
in the model economies,  cunency accounts  for between  80% and 87% of the total
quantity of fiat money.
In  Figure 7, one sees  the hump-shaped pattern  in  the d(PVG)  curve.  The
present value of real seigniorage  revemre  is ma-ximized  at a reserve  ratio equal to
17%. The revemre-maximizing  inflation  rate is lTTo  for these  parameter settings.l3
It  is somewhat surprising to  us that  for these model economies, the revenue-
maximizing policy settings are very close to the sample mean va.lues  comptrted
from the cross-country data.  Thus, on average,  the world sets moneta.ry  policy
quite close  to levels  that  maximize the present vahre of real seigniorage  revenue.
The model is calibrated to  come close to the quantity  of the tax  base for real
seigniorage  revenue  that prerails. Still, it is somewhat of a surprise that with  the
model's preferences  and technology,  we find that  the revemre-maximizing  setting
is so close  to the world's average  policy setting.
6. Summary  and  conclusions
In  ttris paper, we qua,ntify the efiect of two  alternative monetary policies, the
inflation  rate and the reserve  requirement, on the present-vaiue of government
expenditures.  Revemre  in our model comes  from a cornbination of income and
inflation  taxes, where the inflation  tax has a tax base that  is directly dependent
on the reserve  requirement-  We then look at several difierent model economies
to assess  the quantitative  importance of different channels through which these
monetary policies operate.  Specificaliy, we consider three channels. One is an
economy that  grows endogenou.s  and the growth rate is inversely related to the
monetary  policy  variables.  The other two a.re  mea.ns  of avoiding the inflation
tax:  disintermediation  and credit.  Disintermediation occurs becarrse  there aJe
two mearis  of financing. One can avoid the inflation  tax by shifting funds to an
accotnt that  is not subject to reserve  requirements. With  faster money growth,
househoids  shift into credit and out of currency, thus avoiding the inflation tax.
A dynamic Lafier curve is present in those model economies  in which growth
l3For  th.is experiment,  total  reserves account  for  approximately  betaeen  13% and  20% of base
money, depending on the inflation  rate.  Note that  total  reserves  axe approrcirnately  20% of the
quantity  of high-powered money in the U.S.
2lis endogenorn. Hence, our monetary policy  experiments are similar  to the re-
sults found in Ireland  (1994) for fiscal policy.  In  an economy with  a fairly  so-
phisticated.fina.ncial  system and competing methods of payment, we find that the
revemre-maximizing  values  for the monetary policy va.riables  are sruprisingly close
to cross-country sample means observed  irr the data.  The relationship between
monetary policy and the rate of growth is the determining factor in finding a Laf-
fer curve. Indeed, we mn  the experiments in a stationary economy,  finding that
Lafier curve is evident for the part of the parameter space  we consider. Though
smaller quantitatively,  the Ievel of financial development bears on the reventte'
maximizing monetary policy settings. If one eliminates currency from the model,
the Laffer curve shifts to the left;  that  is, the revenue-maximizing reserve  ratio
and inflation rate both decline.
The specific  quantitative  results are as follorvs:
-when both  the  growth  and financing-substitution  effects a.re  present, the
revemre-maximizing reserve requirement is B% and the reventte'maximizing in-
flation rate is 9%;
-for  the same set of experiments, the revenue-maximizing reserve ratio  and
inflation  rate fall to 2% and 1%, respectively in economies  with  extremely fast
disintermediation;
-when only the growth efiect is present,  the settings ate 23Yo  and 34%, respec-
tively;
-when only the financing-substitution effect  is present,  the revenue-maximizing
settings are above the portion of the parameter space  considered  in this paper;
-when currency is added, the revemre-ma-ximizing  settings are around 17%.
Our main goal is to quantify the present  value of real seignorage  revenle across
several different model economies- The economies  are linked by systematically
eliminating specific channels that  afiect the seignorage  tax base. Other authors
have computed revemre.maximizing  inflation rates. Fry (1981),  for example, finds
that real seignorage  revenue  is maximized at with inflation rates in excess  of 50%
for a stationary economy in which governments  have monopoly power over both
currency and deposits.  Otu  chief contribution,  therefore, is that  we can assess
..the impact of a supply-side channel and two difierent avoidance  channels  on the
present ralue of real seignorage  revemre.
We have considered  only revenue as a rnotivating factor for monetary policy.
One potential extension  would be to consider revenue  issues  at business  cycle  fre-
quencies. In  such models, it  may be possible to build  on Auernheimet  (1974).
Another  extension would be to focus on strategic issues  between policymakers:
22when the monetary and fiscal authorities do not coordinate actions, what are the
revenlle  implications? Such questions  hark back to issues  of decentralized  policy-
making common irr the 1970s would the fiscal authority  try  to use the inflation
tax to covertly collect revemre  in a model in which both fiscal and monetary au-
thorities operate independently? It  is likely that  such considerations  would lead
to verv different conchrsions  than the ones  reached  in this paper.References
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